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Fame, Property, and Identity: The Scope 
and Purpose of the Right of Publicity 
Daniel Gervais* & Martin L. Holmes† 
 
 [I]n addition to and independent of that right of 
privacy  . . . a man has a right in the publicity value 
of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclu-
sive privilege of publishing his picture, and that such 
a grant may validly be made ‘in gross,’ i.e., without 
an accompanying transfer of a business or of any-
thing else. Whether it be labelled a ‘property’ right 
is immaterial; for here, as often elsewhere, the tag 
‘property’ simply symbolizes the fact that courts 
enforce a claim which has pecuniary worth. This 
right might be called a ‘right of publicity.’1 
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The right of publicity is not a trademark right. While the right 
of publicity often overlaps with rights granted by trademark law 
and other deception-based restrictions on the use of names and 
symbols,2 the right of publicity creates a more expansive right 
rooted in a variegated normative soil with elements of privacy, per-
sonhood, and property.3 This has a number of significant impacts. 
First, while consumer welfare is a key rationale for trademark law, 
it is an after-the-fact justification—not a compelling motivation—
for the right of publicity. Second, an incentive to produce the ob-
ject of the law’s protection—a musical composition protected by 
copyright, a new molecule protected by a pharmaceutical patent, or 
a quality brand protected by a trademark—can be offered as a ra-
tionale for the existence of most intellectual property rights. But is 
incentivizing the creation of a public persona or notoriety really the 
goal of the right of publicity? We think not. 
                                                                                                                            
2 See 28 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28:8 (4th 
ed. 2014). 
3 See id. 
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The different rationales behind the right of publicity and 
trademark law matter. A trademark owner alleging trademark in-
fringement must prove not that his rights in a particular trademark 
are affected—as would be the case in a copyright or patent con-
text—but rather that the defendant’s use of a similar trademark is 
likely to cause confusion among relevant, reasonably prudent po-
tential purchasers of the product or service related to the trade-
mark.4 The right of publicity gives an individual something akin 
more to a property right in his name or likeness. It allows individu-
als to assert a right in their identity. It allows famous individuals to 
monetize their identity. As the Article explains, fame need not be 
lasting or even acquired deliberately to trigger the publicity right. 
The right of publicity is in its infancy, and the right will be 
tested with new and evolving uses of individuals’ names and like-
nesses. Online uses, and use of celebrities in posts in social media 
are likely to escalate attempts to use the right to bar or restrict on-
line speech. Particularly relevant to the development of the right of 
publicity is the impact that the digital age has on both a celebrity’s 
desire to maintain privacy and, conversely, opportunities for cele-
brities to monetize their likeness (and fame)—from Facebook pag-
es and likes, to Tweets, and many other forms not yet in commer-
cial use, such as projections of three-dimensional celebrity holo-
grams.5 Because of shaky theoretical underpinnings, “judges . . . 
expand the content of persona [to avoid] creating arbitrary distinc-
tions” between who may assert the right of publicity.6 This paper 
seeks to solidify those theoretical underpinnings. 
The evolution of the right should be guided towards a right that 
neither overprotects nor underprotects the commercial use of 
one’s name or likeness. This crucial balancing act is arguably the 
target in all areas of intellectual property law. However, the object 
of protection in the right of publicity—a person’s name and like-
                                                                                                                            
4 See id. § 28:12. 
5 See Evelyn M. Rusli, New Chip to Bring Holograms to Smartphones: Ostendo’s Tiny 
Projectors Are Designed to Display Crisp Video, Glasses-Free 3-D Images, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL, June 2, 2014, http://on.wsj.com/1zR0jyY. 
6 George M. Armstrong, Jr., The Reification of Celebrity: Persona as Property, 51 LA. L. 
REV. 443, 466 (1991). 
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ness—seems the most “personal” of all forms of intellectual prop-
erty law,7 leading to an intuitive notion that the right of publicity 
should grant powerful protections to individuals. Conversely, cele-
brities are also objects of social discourse. They fascinate us. Papa-
razzi hunt them for pictures taken while in public places but also in 
intimate settings.8 We must be allowed to speak about them, but up 
to what point?9 
Protection granted by the right of privacy disposes of a number 
of arguments that the right of publicity is the sole protector of cer-
tain dignitary interests in one’s name and likeness. The expectation 
of privacy does not disappear just because someone is famous—
though it may limit the scope of the reasonable expectation. Fame 
creates a distinct object of protection: the ability to use and monet-
ize one’s likeness.10 When the likeness is directly associated with 
the sale or promotion of a commercial product or service, the law is 
fairly straightforward. Unfair competition law and other deception-
based restrictions, such as the Lanham Act and false endorsement 
                                                                                                                            
7 This Article assumes, but does not argue or endorse, that the right of publicity is a 
form of protection of intangible property that broadly fits under the banner of intellectual 
property law. 
8 See Richard J. Curry, Jr. Diana’s Law, Celebrity And The Paparazzi: The Continuing 
Search For A Solution, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 945, 946 (2000) 
(“Celebrities and the media possess a unique relationship. Many celebrities skillfully use 
the media to market and advertise their movies, television shows, books, and records. 
They use the media to propel their careers and create a marketable celebrity image. 
Society is celebrity crazed and magazines, tabloids and other media forms such as 
Entertainment Tonight and Access Hollywood have combined to feed that craze. Our 
society’s hunger for celebrities has spawned the existence of photographers known as the 
paparazzi. Armed with zoom lenses, high-powered microphones, and the promise of huge 
cash rewards for an exclusive celebrity exposé, the paparazzi have become more intrusive 
and aggressive than ever in their pursuit of private celebrity information.”). 
9 See Stacey Dogan, Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum: Publicity as a Legal 
Right, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE 17, 37 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane 
C. Ginsburg eds., 2014) (“Because the right of publicity has no coherent normative 
objective, the process of balancing celebrity rights against speech interests can appear 
rudderless and ad hoc.”). 
10 In fact, one of the main arguments to justify an inquiry into the right of publicity was 
its direct impact on the value of the estates of famous people. See Larry Moore, Regulating 
Publicity: Does Elvis Want Privacy?, 5 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 1, 8 (1995) 
(“Thus, the debate concerning the nature of publicity is more than an academic argument 
among legal scholars. The manner in which this issue is resolved can, and will, have great 
economic impact on celebrities as well as their estates.”). 
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laws, protect against the use of one’s identity in a false, deceptive, 
or confusing way. In such cases, the goal is to protect members of 
the public against the deception of purchasing a good or service 
they believe to be endorsed by a celebrity.11 The domain that re-
mains for the right of publicity to protect exclusively is revealing: the 
right of publicity alone protects the commercial use of non-
deceptive, non-private references to an individual. The questions 
that emerge are: who benefits from this and why? 
The thesis of this Article is that the right of publicity exists to 
protect rights in an individual’s identity, not for the benefit of con-
sumers. Those rights should die with the individual (or very shortly 
thereafter), extend only to the name and likeness of the individual, 
and must succumb to the First Amendment in certain contexts. 
First, this Article examines the genesis of the right of publicity and 
the manner in which certain courts have defined the boundaries of 
the right and how it differs from the right to privacy. Then, the Ar-
ticle turns to arguments for and against the right of publicity. Most 
importantly, it discusses the overlap between the right of publicity 
and trademark law and explicates the key normative differences 
between the two types of right. Next, the Article discusses the dan-
gers of overprotection and underprotection in the context of the 
right of publicity, along with First Amendment limitations. Finally, 
the Article argues that the current breadth of the right of publicity is 
not supported by compelling motivations, and suggests limiting the 
scope of actionable identity to certain enumerated natural charac-
teristics. 
                                                                                                                            
11 See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992) (The “evidence was 
sufficient to support the jury’s finding that consumers were likely to be misled by the 
commercial into believing that Waits endorsed SalsaRio Doritos.”); see also Allen v. 
Men’s World Outlet, 679 F. Supp. 360, 368–69 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (likelihood of consumer 
confusion established where advertiser intentionally used a look-alike of well-known 
celebrity and where audience to whom commercial was directed intersected with 
celebrity’s audience). 
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I. THE ROOTS OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
A. The Genesis of the Right of Publicity 
“The principal historical antecedent of the right of publicity is 
the right of privacy.”12 Warren and Brandeis first introduced the 
right of privacy in a law review article13 in 1890 as a theory “focus-
ing upon the affront to human dignity caused by public disclosure 
of embarrassing private facts.”14 Over the next seventy years, the 
right of privacy came to encompass four torts, as laid out by Wil-
liam Prosser: “unreasonable intrusions upon another’s seclusion, 
public disclosure of private facts, publicity placing another in a 
false light, and the appropriation for the defendant’s advantage of 
the plaintiff’s name or likeness.”15 The modern day right of public-
ity grew out of Prosser’s appropriation tort.16 
It was not clear at first whether the right to privacy would in-
clude a cause of action for the commercial misappropriation of a 
person’s name or likeness. In 1902, the New York Appellate Divi-
sion, in Roberson, refused to extend the right of privacy to recognize 
injury for emotional distress resulting from the unauthorized use of 
a previously nonfamous plaintiff’s photograph in an advertise-
ment.17 However, in 1905, the Supreme Court of Georgia did find 
nearly identical conduct actionable in Pavesich,18 based largely on 
the theories of “the right to be let alone” advanced in the Warren 
and Brandeis article.19 
                                                                                                                            
12 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (1995). 
13 See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. 
L. REV. 193 (1890). 
14 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:25 (2d ed. 2014). 
15 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995). See William Prosser, 
Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
16 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 1:25. 
17 See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 448 (N.Y. App. Div. 1902) 
(milling company made unauthorized use of plaintiff’s likeness in advertisement along 
with the words “flour of the family”). 
18 See Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 50 S.E. 68, 79–80 (Ga. 1905) 
(holding that defendant insurance company made unauthorized use of plaintiff’s likeness 
in an advertisement). 
19 Id. at 78; see Warren & Brandeis, supra note 13, at 193. 
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The public outrage from the Roberson decision led to the 
enactment of a statute in New York imposing criminal and civil pe-
nalties for the unauthorized use of a person’s name, portrait, or 
picture.20 But the Roberson decision hinted at problems to come 
with using the right of privacy as a cause of action for the commer-
cial misappropriation of one’s identity; the injury in privacy is to 
“mental distress,” not to the commercial interests of an individual. 
As Professors Westfall and Landau noted in 2005: 
[P]ublicity rights may have stemmed from privacy 
rights, but they are clearly also independent of those 
rights—the right question to ask is not simply which 
aspects of plaintiff’s identity are most personal, but 
rather which aspects have value to an advertiser 
based on appropriating the celebrity’s image. Pub-
licity rights, according to most courts and commen-
tators, seem to be based at least as much on pecu-
niary value as on human dignity concerns.21 
The publicity right reifies fame; it allows famous persons to 
commoditize the value of their public persona, or in other words to 
transform their persona into a market-based, tradable commodity.22 
While some judges have pinned the right not to this economic 
realm but rather to the apparent distress caused by the unautho-
rized use of a famous person’s likeness, most courts have been un-
able, to see how a celebrity—someone who has intentionally placed 
himself in the public realm23—could suffer from “mental dis-
                                                                                                                            
20 Prosser, supra note 15, at 385 (asserting that the majority opinion in Roberson created 
“a storm of public disapproval . . . . In consequence the next New York legislature 
enacted a statute making it both a misdemeanor and a tort to make use of the name, 
portrait, or picture of any person for ‘advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade’ 
without his written consent”). 
21 David Westfall & David Landau, Publicity Rights As Property Rights, 23 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 94 n.115 (2005). 
22 See Margaret Jane Radin, Justice and the Market Domain, in NOMOS XXXI, MARKETS 
AND JUSTICE 167 (1989) (“Universal commodification implies that all things can and 
should be separable from persons and exchanged through the free market.”). 
23 In Japan, mental distress is generally not recognized as a form of damage for 
celebrities because they have voluntarily placed themselves in the public eye. See Tōkyō 
Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] June 29, 1976 817 HANJI 23 (Japan.) For an English 
translation, see Doi, Character Merchandising in Japan: Protection of Fictional Characters 
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tress”24 due to a nondeceptive, nonprivate commercial use of their 
name or likeness.25 This distinction is partly what led Judge Jerome 
Frank to create a new label—“the right of publicity”26—a cause of 
action that recognized a person’s entitlement to profits resulting 
from the commercial use of that person’s name or likeness.27 Other 
states followed the lead of New York and Judge Frank, recognizing 
a similar right in the common law or statutorily. Today, at least 
thirty-one states recognize the right of publicity in some form.28 
                                                                                                                            
and Well-Known Personalities as the Basis for Merchandising Activities, ANNUAL OF INDUS. 
PROP. LAW 283 (1978). 
24 See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959–60 
(1982) (“One may gauge the strength or significance of someone’s relationship with an 
object by the kind of pain that would be occasioned by its loss. On this view, an object is 
closely related to one’s personhood if its loss causes pain that cannot be relieved by the 
object’s replacement. If so, that particular object is bound up with the holder . . . . The 
opposite of holding an object that has become a part of oneself is holding an object that is 
perfectly replaceable with other goods of equal market value. One holds such an object for 
purely instrumental reasons.”). 
25 O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1941) (rejecting plaintiff’s 
“complaint . . . that he was damaged by the invasion of his privacy in so using his picture 
as to create the impression that he was endorsing beer”). See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, 
§ 1:25 (“[W]hen a plaintiff whose identity was already well known sued under [the right 
of privacy appropriation tort] approach, the courts could not see how there could be 
‘indignity’ or ‘mental distress’ when plaintiff’s identity was already in widespread use in 
the media.”). But see Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1103 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The 
defendants argue that in right of publicity actions, only damages to compensate for 
economic injury are available. We disagree. Although the injury stemming from violation 
of the right of publicity ‘may be largely, or even wholly, of an economic or material 
nature,’ we have recognized that ‘it is quite possible that the appropriation of the identity 
of a celebrity may induce humiliation, embarrassment, and mental distress.’”). 
26 Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953) 
(“For it is common knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-
players), far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their 
likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing 
advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, 
busses, trains and subways”); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 1:26 (“Judge Jerome Frank 
in 1953 was the first to coin the term ‘right of publicity.’”). 
27 A number of commentators have noted that the economic harm rationale for the 
right of publicity is circular. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 2:2 (arguing that it is 
circular reasoning to base legal protection upon economic value when economic value 
depends upon legal protection (citing Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the 
Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 815 (1935))). 
28 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 6:3 (“At the time of this writing, courts have 
expressly recognized the right of publicity as existing under the common law of 21 states. 
Of those, eight also have statutory provisions broad enough to encompass the right of 
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B. The Overbreadth of the Right of Publicity 
One case that claimed a violation of privacy, the Lanham Act, 
and the right of publicity came in 1983 when the Sixth Circuit 
found that the defendant’s “Here’s Johnny” portable toilet vi-
olated Johnny Carson’s right of publicity.29 The phrase “Here’s 
Johnny” was used to introduce Johnny Carson each night on his 
wildly successful late night variety show.30 The business name 
“Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets” was used in conjunction with 
the catchphrase “The World’s Foremost Commodian.”31 The 
court found that the portable toilet company did not create a like-
lihood of confusion that consumers would think Johnny Carson 
was affiliated with the company.32 Interestingly, the court also held 
that Johnny Carson’s right of privacy had not been infringed.33 
However, the court did find an infringement of the right of publici-
ty,34 noting the many other licensed commercial uses of the phrase 
“Here’s Johnny”35 and the corporation’s knowledge of the noto-
riety of Carson and his show.36 Then, Carson was “harmed” only 
because the court recognized the right of publicity in this instance. 
The public was not harmed at all. The dissent noted that he did not 
believe “the common law right of publicity may be extended 
beyond an individual’s name, likeness, achievements, identifying 
characteristics or actual performances, to include phrases or other 
things which are merely associated with the individual, as is the 
phrase ‘Here’s Johnny.’”37 
                                                                                                                            
publicity. In addition, ten states have statutes which, while some are labeled ‘privacy’ 
statutes, are worded in such a way that most aspects of the right of publicity are embodied 
in those statutes. Thus, at the time of this writing, under either statute or common law, 
the right of publicity is recognized as the law of 31 states.”). 
29 See Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 836 (6th Cir. 
1983). 
30 Id. at 832. 
31 Id. at 833. 
32 See id. at 834. 
33 See id. 
34 See id. at 836. 
35 See id. at 833. 
36 See id. 
37 Id. at 837 (Kennedy, J. dissenting). 
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White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. is a case finding an 
infringement of the right of publicity in extreme circumstances.38 
In White, an “advertisement . . . for Samsung video-cassette re-
corders (VCRs) . . . depicted a robot, dressed in a wig, gown, and 
jewelry which [defendants] consciously selected to resemble [Van-
na] White’s hair and dress.”39 “The robot was posed next to a 
game board which is instantly recognizable as the Wheel of Fortune 
game show set, in a stance for which White is famous.”40 This ad-
vertisement was one in a series of advertisements making future 
predictions, and accordingly, the ad included the caption “Long-
est-running game show. 2012 A.D.”41 “The gag here . . . was that 
Samsung would still be around when White had been replaced by a 
robot.”42 
Dissenting from an order rejecting the suggestion for rehearing 
en banc in White, Judge Kozinski said: 
The panel’s opinion is a classic case of overprotec-
tion. Concerned about what it sees as a wrong done 
to Vanna White, the panel majority erects a proper-
ty right of remarkable and dangerous breadth: Un-
der the majority’s opinion, it’s now a tort for adver-
tisers to remind the public of a celebrity. Not to use a 
celebrity’s name, voice, signature or likeness; not to 
imply the celebrity endorses a product; but simply 
to evoke the celebrity’s image in the public’s 
mind.43 
In Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., the Ninth Circuit once again recog-
nized an expansive right of publicity.44 Tom Waits, a singer known 
                                                                                                                            
38 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting). 
39 Id. at 1396. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993) denying petition for 
reh’g. 
43 Id. 
44 Although technically referred to as a “[v]oice misappropriation” claim in the 
opinion, the court recognized that “[t]he Midler tort [of voice misappropriation] is a 
species of violation of the ‘right of publicity,’ the right of a person whose identity has 
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for his raspy voice, maintained a policy throughout his career that 
he would not do endorsements because he did not want to detract 
from his artistic integrity.45 After an advertising company concep-
tualized an advertisement based off of a Tom Waits song, the court 
concluded the advertising agency felt “that no one would do but a 
singer who could . . . imitate Tom Waits’ voice.”46 To that end, 
the defendants engaged a performer who had “perfected an imita-
tion of Waits’ voice” to sing in the advertisement.47 In finding that 
the advertising agency and Frito-Lay “acted with malice” and vi-
olated Waits’ right of publicity, the court focused on the defen-
dants’ knowledge of Waits’ policy against endorsements and legal 
concerns that the sound-a-like singer sounded too much like Tom 
Waits.48 The apparent harm of Frito-Lay’s use was that Waits rea-
lized “immediately that whoever was going to hear this and ob-
viously identify the voice would also identify that [Tom Waits] in 
fact had agreed to do a commercial for Doritos.”49 
The facts in Waits clearly show a likelihood of confusion as to a 
false endorsement from Waits, extended beyond the more typical 
visual likeness to include aural confusion. The Court did find a vi-
olation of the Lanham Act.50 However, the court vacated damages 
awarded under the Lanham Act because those damages were dup-
licative of damages received for the right of publicity violation.51 
Thus, it appears that the right of publicity is not necessary to allow 
a celebrity to assert a cause of action against an advertiser who in-
tentionally mimics the voice of the celebrity and causes confusion 
                                                                                                                            
commercial value—most often a celebrity—to control the commercial use of that 
identity.” Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing 
Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 825 (9th Cir. 1974)). 
45 See id. 
46 Id. at 1097. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 1105. 
49 Id. at 1098. 
50 See id. at 1111 (“Th[e] evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that 
consumers were likely to be misled by the commercial into believing that Waits endorsed 
SalsaRio Doritos.”). 
51 See id. (“The jury awarded Waits $100,000 on [the Lanham Act] claim. It also 
awarded Waits $100,000 for the fair market value of his services on his voice 
misappropriation claim. The damages awarded under the Lanham Act, therefore, are 
duplicative. Accordingly, we vacate this portion of the judgment.”). 
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among consumers as to endorsement or sponsorship.52 Waits is the 
aural equivalent to a long line of look-alike cases—where look-alike 
actors are hired to stand in place of a celebrity.53 The plaintiffs in 
those cases, as in Waits, have a cause of action under false en-
dorsement and other deception-based restrictions. 
In Hart, the likeness of Ryan Hart, a former all-star quarterback 
for Rutgers, was used by Electronic Arts in their NCAA Football 
series of videogames without a license.54 The likenesses of count-
less other collegiate football players were also used in the same 
manner in making the video games.55 As a condition of participa-
tion in NCAA athletics, Mr. Hart agreed to not accept “any remu-
neration or permit[] the use of his . . . name or picture to advertise, 
recommend or promote directly the sale or use of a commercial 
product or service of any kind.”56 Although Mr. Hart’s name was 
not used in the videogame, the players in the game “are populated 
by digital avatars that resemble their real-life counterparts and 
share their vital and biographical information. . . . [F]or example, in 
NCAA Football 2006, Rutgers’ quarterback, player number 13, is 
6’2” tall, weighs 197 pounds and resembles Hart.”57 
In what reads more like a treatise than a judicial opinion,58 the 
Third Circuit adopted the transformative use test—whether the 
defendant made significant contributions in the use to make the use 
her own expression59—for balancing the right of publicity with the 
First Amendment in Hart. Despite the addition of many creative 
elements to the videogame, the Court found that the video games 
“do not sufficiently transform Appellant’s identity to escape the 
                                                                                                                            
52 But see Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462–63 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting 
unfair competition claim because “Midler did not do television commercials. The 
defendants were not in competition with her.”). 
53 Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 257 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1984) aff’d, 488 N.Y.S.2d 943 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (involving a Jacqueline Onassis 
look-alike used in a Dior advertisement). 
54 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 146 n.5 (3d Cir. 2013). 
55 See id. at 168. 
56 Id. at 145. 
57 Id. 
58 The opinion surveys the right of publicity case law and the merits of the different 
tests proposed by courts and scholars. See id. at 152–65. 
59 Infra, Section IV.A. 
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right of publicity claim.”60 The dissent in Hart would have also 
applied the transformative use test, but would have reached a dif-
ferent conclusion: “Hart’s ‘likeness is one of the ‘raw materials’ 
from which [the] original work is synthesized . . . [rather than] the 
very sum and substance of the work in question.’”61 Thus, the dis-
senting judge, applying the transformative use test, would have 
found that the First Amendment shielded Electronic Arts from 
Hart’s right of publicity claim. 
Hart presents a most difficult set of facts. However, wherever 
the appropriate line is in balancing the right of publicity with the 
First Amendment, Hart is near it.62 In the dissent, Judge Ambro 
noted that Hart’s case is a sympathetic one because Hart and other 
college football players are huge economic engines that are uncom-
pensated.63 
Are White, Hart, Here’s Johnny, and Waits beyond the scope of 
a right of publicity that conforms to the First Amendment and the 
compelling motivations for the existence of the right? Those cases 
ask the right basic factual inquiries, but whether the results are 
based on the right balance of interests is the real question. Does 
granting Vanna White a monopoly in being a blond co-host or side-
kick on Wheel of Fortune benefit the public? Does merely reminding 
consumers of Ms. White go far beyond infringing the rights she 
might possess in her likeness? Does the public benefit from Johnny 
Carson preventing the use of “Here’s Johnny” in an arguably hu-
morous way? Is a phrase like “Here’s Johnny” properly within the 
scope of the right of publicity? Why does Tom Waits need to be 
able to assert a right of publicity when false endorsement prohibi-
tions achieve the same result? 
                                                                                                                            
60 Id. at 170. 
61 Id. at 175 (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
62 See generally id.; see also No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 
400–01 (Cal. 2011) (“[W]e conclude that the creative elements of the Band Hero 
videogame do not transform the images of No Doubt’s band members into anything more 
than literal, fungible reproductions of their likenesses. Therefore, we reject Activision’s 
contention that No Doubt’s right of publicity claim is barred by the First Amendment.”). 
63 See Hart, 717 F.3d at 171 (Ambro, J., dissenting) (“The burn to Hart and other 
amateur athletes is that, unlike their active professional counterparts, they are not 
compensated for EA’s use of their likenesses in its video games.”). 
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II. THE RATIONALES FOR AND AGAINST THE RIGHT OF 
PUBLICITY 
A. Compelling Motivations for the Right of Publicity 
The right of publicity’s historical roots in privacy show the 
nexus between the right of publicity and the natural rights many 
believe a person has in his name and likeness. “The courts have 
uniformly held that the right of publicity is a ‘property’ right.”64 
According to some commentators, human identity is a self-evident 
property right and the law should protect a person’s identity just as 
the law protects any other property right.65 Others say that a hu-
man possesses a natural right of “autonomous self-definition.”66 
Both of these theories are grounded in “the notion that my identity 
is mine—it is my property to control as I see fit.”67 In the words of 
John Proctor,68 an individual should be able to control the use of his 
name simply “because it is my name!”69 Accordingly, many of 
those who believe that the right of publicity is supported by natural 
or property rights feel that, in the absence of sufficient countervail-
ing considerations, no other justification for the right of publicity is 
necessary.70 
                                                                                                                            
64 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 10:7. 
65 See 1 id. §§ 2:1–2:2 (“Perhaps nothing is so strongly intuited as the notion that my 
identity is mine—it is my property to control as I see fit.”). 
66 M.P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 225, 285 (2005) (“Since all individuals share the interest in autonomous self-
definition, every individual should be able to control uses of her identity that interfere 
with her ability to define her own public character  . . . . [E]ven uses that do not suggest 
endorsement may disrupt the message an individual seeks to portray by competing with 
meaning the individual has tried to project.”); see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 2:9. 
67 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, §§ 2:1–2:2. 
68 The authors expressly disclaim any endorsement, sponsorship, affiliation, 
relationship, reminder, association, or any other authorization—implied or otherwise—
from Arthur Miller, Arthur Miller’s Estate, Daniel Day–Lewis, or John Proctor. 
69 ARTHUR MILLER, THE CRUCIBLE 143 (1976). 
70 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 2:1 (“Those who are critical of [the natural rights 
of property justification for the right of publicity] should have the burden to articulate 
some important countervailing social policy which negates this natural impulse of 
justice.”); id. § 2:3 (“The advocate of a right of publicity, when called upon to explain 
why such a right should exist at all, is not being illogical in simply challenging: ‘Why 
not?’”). 
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“In brief, [an individual] in his lifetime ha[s] a right to create in 
his name and/or likeness ‘ . . . a right of value,’ which could have 
been transmuted into things of value or [the individual] could, if he 
elected not to exercise such right, protect it from invasion by others 
by a suit for injunction and/or damages.”71 Then, the right of pub-
licity recognizes the fact that some individuals live a life of solitude 
and others a life of publicity. This difference is particularly valuable 
in the situation of unauthorized use of an accurate picture or depic-
tion of a nonfamous (or previously nonfamous) individual in adver-
tisement, as occurred in Pavesich and Roberson. It should be noted 
that, in this situation, the right of publicity grants individuals a 
right that is perhaps subtly different from privacy; it allows indi-
viduals to stay out of the public eye by prohibiting truthful, nonde-
ceptive speech about an individual just outside of the right of priva-
cy. The right of publicity protects also against unwanted fame.72 
The normative confusion about the right of publicity is precisely 
that it performs what may be considered two different functions. In 
the case of unwanted “fame,” it provides a remedy for an individ-
ual who did not want the fame to begin with. Here, the right is an 
extension of its historical anchor, the right of privacy, that is, the 
right to be let alone. When fame is wanted, then the right of public-
ity becomes an entirely new right: a right to manage fame. 
There are other compelling motivations advanced to support 
the right of publicity. Economists may argue that the right of pub-
licity grants the most efficient user of an individual’s name and 
likeness the right to its use.73 Significantly, the right of publicity 
facilitates the licensing of an individual’s name and likeness74—a 
                                                                                                                            
71 Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 428 (Cal. 1979). 
72 It bears emphasis, however, that unwanted is not the same as unplanned but 
accepted after the fact, such as for those who perform heroic actions or otherwise gain 
substantial media attention. 
73 See Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of 
International News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 411, 414 (1983) (“In a 
market economy, granting individuals exclusive rights to property is an effective way of 
allocating scarce resources.”). 
74 See Joseph R. Grodin, The Right of Publicity: A Doctrinal Innovation, 62 YALE L.J. 
1123, 1126–27 (1953) (“This new right of publicity allows a licensee of a famous person 
adequate protection against third parties. Traditionally, direct action by the licensee 
against such parties was permitted where they had induced breach of the contract. And, in 
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process that may otherwise involve a more complex transaction 
and a less complete transfer of rights.75 It also prevents the overuse 
of an individual’s name and likeness.76 
The right of publicity may also protect individuals and the pub-
lic from certain deceptive or false commercial uses of an individu-
al’s name and likeness in addition to false endorsement laws, the 
Lanham Act, and other related laws.77 Similarly, the right of public-
ity provides an independent cause of action for commercial uses of 
a person’s name and likeness that may also violate privacy law by 
way of damage to the individual’s dignitary interests. However, 
prohibiting uses that are protected by the right of privacy and de-
ception-based restrictions should not be used independently to jus-
tify the right of publicity. Although overlapping laws are a neces-
sary evil, planned redundancy is not desirable. 
B. Arguments Against a (Broad) Right of Publicity 
Professor Michael Madow, who taught for many years at 
Brooklyn Law School, presented a compelling case against the right 
of publicity.78 He advanced four main arguments. First, Madow 
                                                                                                                            
addition, use of a name or picture could be enjoined where continued use constituted 
trademark infringement. Otherwise the licensee’s remedy had to be against his licensor. 
And in all cases damages—presumably based on lost profits—would be difficult to 
prove.”). 
75 For example, in Germany the commercial use of one’s name or likeness involves a 
covenant not to sue and an incomplete transfer of rights to the licensee. See Daniel Biene, 
Celebrity, Culture, Individuality and Right of Publicity as a European Legal Issue, 36 IIC 505, 
518 (2005) (“[A]ny right related to personality is under German law strictly inalienable 
and not transferable . . . [licensing] is generally done by means of an agreement not to sue, 
since the right itself cannot be transferred to third parties.”). 
76 Mark F. Grady, A Positive Economic Theory of the Right of Publicity, 1 UCLA ENT. L. 
REV. 97, 110-126 (1994) (The right of publicity helps to prevent rent dissipation). 
77 Because a false use of an individual’s name and likeness necessarily means the 
plaintiff is identifiable, the right of publicity may be asserted if the plaintiff’s name or 
likeness is used in a false or deceptive way for commercial gain. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra 
note 14, § 2:8 (“The problem with the rationale of preventing false advertising is that 
falsity of endorsement does not mark the outer boundary of the right of publicity. A 
clearly false endorsement is separately actionable under state law or Lanham Act § 43(a) 
as a form of false or misleading advertising. If legally provable falsity is necessary to state a 
claim for invasion of the right of publicity, it would be a redundant legal theory.”). 
78 See generally Michael P. Madow, Private Ownership Of Public Image: Popular Culture 
And Right of Publicity, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 127 (1993). 
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argued that the right of publicity “redistributes wealth upwards.”79 
“Why not,” he asked, “instead treat a famous person’s name and 
face ‘as a common asset to be shared, an economic opportunity 
available in the free market system?’”80 Second, Madow argued 
that there are significant distributional consequences.81 The right 
of publicity raises the price of celebrity merchandise and of adver-
tising in general, thereby shifting wealth away from the great mass 
of consumers to a very small group of persons who are already very 
handsomely compensated.”82 This works to the advantage of larger 
advertisers.83 Hoffman had made a similar point, labeling the phe-
nomenon “net social disutility.”84 Third, as the title of his article 
suggests, Madow argued that there is a risk of private appropriation 
and censorship of popular culture.85 He made this point rather 
forcefully: 
It is impossible, I think, for the law to remain neu-
tral in this contest. The law can strengthen the al-
ready potent grip of the culture industries over the 
production and circulation of meaning, or it can fa-
cilitate popular participation, including participation 
by subordinate and marginalized groups, in the 
processes by which meaning is made and communi-
cated.86 
Fourth and finally, Madow argued that the right of publicity 
creates incentives to overinvest in celebrity.87 Professor Radin 
made a similar, though broader argument when she noted: 
In the context of property for personhood, then, a 
“thing” that someone claims to be bound up with 
                                                                                                                            
79 Id. at 136–37. 
80 Id. at 137 (quoting Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 960 
(6th Cir. 1980)). 
81 Id. at 218–19. 
82 Id. at 218. 
83 Id. at 224. 
84 Stephen J. Hoffman, Limitations on the Right of Publicity, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 
111, 120 (1980). 
85 See Madow, supra note 78, at 138. 
86 Id. at 141–42. 
87 Id. at 216. 
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nevertheless should not be treated as personal vis-à-
vis other people’s claimed rights and interests when 
there is an objective moral consensus that to be 
bound up with that category of “thing” is inconsis-
tent with personhood or healthy self-constitution.88 
In the context of the right of publicity, Professor Madow asked: 
Is it not at least possible that society would be better 
off if some of the kids who are now devoting them-
selves to perfecting their jumpshots (or guitar riffs) 
in the usually vain hope of making it to the NBA (or 
the top of the charts) said ‘to hell with it,’ and 
started thinking of other ways of making a liv-
ing? . . . . The high visibility of sports and enter-
tainment careers means that it is easier (and cheap-
er) for people to find out about these careers . . . . 
[S]ports and entertainment are fields in which nar-
cissism, vanity, fantasy, and self-deception probably 
take more than their usual toll on rational decision 
making. Aspirants in these fields are especially likely 
both to overestimate their talents (and their chances 
of ‘making it’) and to underestimate the quality of 
their competition. . . . [P]eople considering careers 
in these fields do not have anything approaching 
perfect information about just how long the odds on 
success actually are.89 
In answering each of those points, Julius Pinckaers first noted 
that allowing commercial exploitation of a persona without autho-
rization enriches the company using it (e.g. for promotional pur-
poses), which does not necessarily ameliorate the redistribution or 
concentration of wealth.90 Second, Pinckaers noted that there are 
distributional consequences, but that they are outweighed by ad-
vantages. Providing an exclusive right on commercial use of a per-
sona generates allocative efficiencies because the market will allow 
                                                                                                                            
88 See Radin, supra note 22, at 959–60. 
89 Madow, supra note 78, at 216–18. 
90 JULIUS C.S. PINCKAERS, FROM PRIVACY TOWARD A NEW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHT IN PERSONA 241 (1996). 
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the famous person to maximize the value of the advertising at the 
cost that advertisers are willing to pay. There are many celebrities 
and their personae can be used in several different contexts. De-
mand is often elastic, and “the owner is less likely to maintain a 
price that excludes potential users.”91 If this is correct, consumers 
pay more because they value the image of their favorite celebrity on 
a product, that is, product + desirable association = more value 
than product alone.92 Third, Pinckaers noted that, while there are 
potential conflicts between the right of publicity and free speech, a 
balancing test can be created to deal with such conflicts.93 Finally, 
Pinckaers noted that even without a right of publicity people would 
enter the sports or arts fields for “other (psychological) reasons.”94 
C. The Improper Use of Trademark Rationales to Justify the Right 
of Publicity 
Rationales that are used to justify trademark law should not be 
offered to justify the right of publicity simply because the two 
rights seem similar. The two rights are motivated by different pri-
mary concerns: trademark law reduces search costs for consumers 
and incentivizes quality through accountability;95 the right of pub-
licity, meanwhile, allows an individual to profit from and exercise 
control over the commercial use of his name and likeness because 
                                                                                                                            
91 Id. at 254. 
92 See id. at 256. 
93 See id. ch. 9.3. 
94 Id. at 256. 
95 Most commentators also justify trademark law as protecting a trademark holder’s 
property rights. See Indus. Rayon Corp. v. Dutchess Underwear Corp., 92 F.2d 33, 35 (2d 
Cir. 1937) (“A trade-mark is not property in the ordinary sense but only a word or symbol 
indicating the origin of a commercial product.” Hand, J.); see also Mark P. McKenna, The 
Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1841 (2007) 
(“[T]rademark law, like all unfair competition law, sought to protect producers from 
illegitimate diversions of their trade by competitors . . . . [A]merican courts protected 
producers from illegitimately diverted trade by recognizing property rights.”); 1 
MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 2:2 (“Trademark law serves to protect both consumers from 
deception and confusion over trade symbols and to protect the plaintiff’s infringed 
trademark as property.”); but cf. id. § 2:1 (“The interest of the public in not being 
deceived has been called the basic policy [concern of unfair competition law] . . . [b]ut 
there is also the policy of encouraging competition from which the public benefits.”). 
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of natural rights.96 “[S]ome courts have failed to see the important 
distinctions and have unthinkingly imported certain inapplicable 
pieces of trademark doctrine into right of publicity cases  . . . . Such 
courts miss the important reality that the right of publicity is only 
analogous, not identical, to the law of trademarks.”97 
The aspect of trademark law that is most analogous to the right 
of publicity is dilution. To succeed on a dilution claim, the mark 
owner must show that the mark is famous and distinctive.98 A 
trademark holder could succeed under either a dilution by blurring 
(if the use impairs the distinctiveness of the mark) claim or under a 
dilution by tarnishment (if the use harms the reputation of the 
mark) claim.99 Dilution is a cause of action for uses of a mark that 
create an association between a famous mark and the defendant’s 
symbol—a standard lower than likelihood of confusion.100 Thus, 
dilution claims can be asserted in the absence of confusion, finding 
echo in property rights, not consumer protection. 
A number of scholars believe that federal protection against di-
lution of famous marks was a poor policy choice, because trade-
mark law’s primary normative concern is supposedly to protect 
consumers, and the vast majority of consumer harm occurs where 
there is confusion.101 Dilution without confusion does not harm 
consumers; it may harm a brand, however. 
                                                                                                                            
96 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 5:6 (“[A]fter adding up all the differences and 
similarities [between trademark and the right of publicity], the differences outweigh the 
similarities. The differences stem largely from the historical fact that the right of publicity 
had its origins in the law of ‘privacy,’ whereas the law of trademarks had its origins in the 
tort of fraud.”). 
97 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 155 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Various commentators 
have noted that right of publicity claims—at least those that address the use of a person’s 
name or image in an advertisement—are akin to trademark claims because in both 
instances courts must balance the interests in protecting the relevant property right 
against the interest in free expression.” (citing ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 
915, 924 (6th Cir. 2003))); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 5:6. 
98 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, L.L.C., 507 F.3d 252, 264 n. 2 
(4th Cir. 2007). 
99 Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 551 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
100 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2012). 
101 See, e.g., Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational 
Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789 (1997). 
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For the purposes of this Article, parallels with trademark dilu-
tion do not answer the normative question about the right of pub-
licity because that right lies outside of federal trademark law. Like 
dilution, however, the right of publicity may be asserted where 
there is no confusion; in fact, consumer confusion is often not a 
consideration at all with the right of publicity.102 It does then re-
semble a property right. 
Where a famous person is selling a product or service using a 
likeness, name or signature as a trademark, then trademark law ap-
plies if a likelihood of source or sponsorship confusion exists. That 
said, overlapping trademark and publicity analyses lead to norma-
tive confusion between the right of publicity and trademark law. 
Let us explore the difference in greater detail. 
Trademarks perform four basic functions: 
(1) To identify one seller’s goods and distinguish 
them from goods sold by others; 
(2) To signify that all goods bearing the trademark 
come from or are controlled by a single, albeit ano-
nymous, source; 
(3) To signify that all goods bearing the trademark 
are of an equal level of quality; and 
(4) As a prime instrument in advertising and selling 
the goods.103 
A trademark represents the goodwill an entity has accumu-
lated.104 It allows consumers to become repeat customers and in-
form other consumers of their good experience;105 conversely, it 
allows consumers to not repeat their business and to inform others 
                                                                                                                            
102 See Hart, 717 F.3d at 158 (“[T]he right of publicity does not implicate the potential 
for consumer confusion.”). 
103 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 3:2. 
104 See id. (“Without the identification function performed by trademarks, buyers would 
have no way of returning to buy products that they have used and liked. If this consumer 
satisfaction and preference is labeled ‘good will,’ then a trademark is the symbol by which 
the world can identify that good will.”). 
105 See id. 
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of a bad experience. Trademarks therefore reduce transaction 
costs106 and incentivize quality goods.107 
Public benefits flowing from the right of publicity are not so 
clear, especially when compared to trademark rationales.108 In the 
words of the Restatement: 
The rationales underlying recognition of a right of 
publicity are generally less compelling than those 
that justify rights in trademarks or trade secrets. 
The commercial value of a person’s identity often 
results from success in endeavors such as enter-
tainment or sports that offer their own substantial 
rewards. Any additional incentive attributable to the 
right of publicity may have only marginal signific-
ance. In other cases the commercial value acquired 
by a person’s identity is largely fortuitous or other-
wise unrelated to any investment made by the indi-
vidual, thus diminishing the weight of the property 
and unjust enrichment rationales for protection. In 
addition, the public interest in avoiding false sugges-
tions of endorsement or sponsorship can be pursued 
through the cause of action for deceptive market-
ing.109  
It is also difficult to see how any consumer benefits from having 
his perception of goods and services deliberately altered by the en-
dorsement of a celebrity.110 Could one not argue that, if a celebrity 
believes in a product—as endorsements are intended to show—
presumably she will not need to be compensated to use it? 
                                                                                                                            
106 See Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The fundamental 
purpose of a trademark is to reduce consumer search costs by providing a concise and 
unequivocal identifier of the particular source of particular goods.”). 
107 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 3:2. 
108 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. R.I, 517 U.S. 484, 499, 504 (1996) (“[A] blanket 
prohibition against truthful, nonmisleading speech . . . serves an end unrelated to 
consumer protection.”). 
109 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995). 
110 The perception of goods and services changes when celebrities that a consumer 
identifies with endorse a product. See Michael D. Basil, Identification as a Mediator of 
Celebrity Effects, 40 J. BROADCASTING & ELEC. MEDIA 478, 478 (1996). 
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While trademark law confers clear benefits on the public, the 
connection between the right of publicity and public welfare is 
comparatively attenuated—too much so to support the very exis-
tence of the right. Hence, if the right of publicity should exist at all, 
it should exist as a natural right in an individual’s celebrity and 
identity. 
D. Unjust Enrichment and the Right of Publicity 
Unjust enrichment is frequently advanced as the underpinning 
for the right of publicity; those who use an individual’s likeness 
free ride on the goodwill that individual has amassed, and are 
therefore unjustly enriched. This intuition can be traced to Haelan 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,111 the case most 
courts and scholars credit with creating the right of publicity.112 
According to Professor Dogan: 
[T]he Haelan court deliberately abandoned a harms-
based approach to celebrity right of publicity in fa-
vor of an approach centered on unjust enrichment. 
In doing so, the court paved the way for a presump-
tion of celebrities’ entitlement to every cent of 
commercial value conferred by the use of their iden-
tities, without regard to whether the use caused 
them any reputational or personal harm.113  
We agree that overemphasis on unjust enrichment as the ratio-
nale for the right of publicity has led to its overbreadth. 
While the doctrine has intuitive appeal and may inform an 
equitable analysis, and may indeed be appropriate in some circums-
tances, an analysis of unjust enrichment illustrates that it should 
not be used to justify the existence of the right of publicity. As the 
Restatement asserts, “a person who is unjustly enriched at the ex-
pense of another is subject to liability in restitution.”114 Thus, un-
just enrichment is actionable only where: (1) there is an injustice; 
(2) and an enrichment has occurred; (3) “at the expense of anoth-
                                                                                                                            
111 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
112 See Dogan, supra note 9, at 18. 
113 Id. 
114 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (2011). 
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er.” In the context of intellectual property law, the Restatement 
rule is: “A person who obtains a benefit by misappropriation or in-
fringement of another’s legally protected rights in any idea, expres-
sion, information, image, or designation is liable in restitution to 
the holder of such rights.”115 
Importantly, the Restatement recognizes unjust enrichment 
where there has been an infringement of another’s “legally pro-
tected” rights. In the right of publicity, there is anything but a con-
sensus that many infringing uses are unjust, or “at the expense of 
another.” Thus, unjust enrichment in the right of publicity context 
runs in to a circular reasoning problem: there is only an injustice, at 
the expense of another, if the law first protects the use of a per-
son’s name or likeness.116 Thus, we return to the real question: 
what should be the boundaries of the right of publicity? 
III. THE DANGERS OF OVERPROTECTION 
Over twenty years ago, Judge Alex Kozinski recognized the 
dangers posed by an overly expansive right of publicity.117 In a 
stinging dissent, Judge Kozinski argued that the Ninth Circuit had 
extended the right of publicity too far when the court found a hu-
morous TV ad featuring a robot dressed as a woman on a Wheel of 
Fortune look-alike set to infringe Vanna White’s right of publici-
ty.118 Judge Kozinski observed: 
                                                                                                                            
115 Id. § 42. 
116 See Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. 
REV. 809, 815 (1935) (asserting that it is circular reasoning to base legal protection upon 
economic value when economic value depends upon legal protection). 
117 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting). 
118 Id. See also Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 976 
(10th Cir. 1996) (“One of the primary goals of intellectual property law is to maximize 
creative expression. The law attempts to achieve this goal by striking a proper balance 
between the right of a creator to the fruits of his labor and the right of future creators to 
free expression. Underprotection of intellectual property reduces the incentive to create; 
overprotection creates a monopoly over the raw material of creative expression. The 
application of the Oklahoma right of publicity statute to Cardtoons’ trading cards 
presents a classic case of overprotection. Little is to be gained, and much lost, by 
protecting MLBPA’s right to control the use of its members’ identities in parody trading 
cards.”). 
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Something very dangerous is going on here. Private 
property, including intellectual property, is essential 
to our way of life. It provides an incentive for in-
vestment and innovation; it stimulates the flourish-
ing of our culture; it protects the moral entitlements 
of people to the fruits of their labors. But reducing 
too much to private property can be bad medicine. 
Private land, for instance, is far more useful if sepa-
rated from other private land by public streets, 
roads and highways. Public parks, utility rights-of-
way and sewers reduce the amount of land in private 
hands, but vastly enhance the value of the property 
that remains. 
 
So too it is with intellectual property. Overprotect-
ing intellectual property is as harmful as underpro-
tecting it. Creativity is impossible without a rich 
public domain. Nothing today, likely nothing since 
we tamed fire, is genuinely new: Culture, like 
science and technology, grows by accretion, each 
new creator building on the works of those who 
came before. Overprotection stifles the very creative 
forces it’s supposed to nurture.119  
The First Amendment provides several tools for limiting the 
right of publicity arising out of the ways it has been used and ap-
plied in other, related contexts. For example, ideas and facts are 
not copyrightable.120 A fair use—that is a use that is generally 
transformative121—“is not an infringement of copyright.”122 Fur-
                                                                                                                            
119 White, 989 F.2d at 1513 (Kozinksi, J., dissenting). 
120 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1879) (demonstrating that standard accounting 
forms are not copyrightable). 
121 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
122 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). (“In determining whether the use made of a work in any 
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include— 
the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of 
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
the nature of the copyrighted work; 
the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
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ther, copyright law grants compulsory licenses.123 The nominative 
fair use124 and descriptive fair use125 doctrines make room for the 
First Amendment in trademark law.126 Similarly, the right of pub-
licity must yield to the First Amendment, even if the subject of its 
protection—a human being’s identity—is perhaps the most “per-
sonal” in all intellectual property law. 
The First Amendment often erects a lower hurdle for asserting 
a publicity right, because the use may amount to commercial 
speech.127 This does not make the First Amendment meaningless 
though, as Judge Kozinski explained: “The majority dismisses the 
First Amendment issue out of hand because Samsung’s ad was 
commercial speech. So what? Commercial speech may be less pro-
tected by the First Amendment than noncommercial speech, but 
less protected means protected nonetheless.”128 Similarly, in the 
context of advertising,129 the Supreme Court has said “we may as-
                                                                                                                            
the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.”). 
123 17 U.S.C. §§ 115, 119(b) (2012). 
124 See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 
1992) (“[H]ere the defendant uses a trademark to describe the plaintiff’s product, rather 
than its own, we hold that a commercial user is entitled to a nominative fair use defense 
provided he meets the following three requirements: First, the product or service in 
question must be one not readily identifiable without use of the trademark; second, only 
so much of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the 
product or service; and third, the user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with 
the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.”). 
125 See WCVB-TV v. Boston Athletic Ass’n, 926 F.2d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 1991) (“[T]he use 
of words for descriptive purposes is called a ‘fair use,’ and the law usually permits it even 
if the words themselves also constitute a trademark.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) 
(2012). 
126 See New Kids, 971 F.2d at 306–08. 
127 Thomas F. Cotter & Irina Y. Dmitrieva, Integrating the Right of Publicity with First 
Amendment and Copyright Preemption Analysis, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 165, 195 (2010) 
(“[T]he right of publicity is often applied to commercial speech. In these cases, the 
exercise of publicity rights is generally consistent with the First Amendment.”). 
128 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1519 (9th Cir. 1993). 
129 Commercial uses of an individual’s name or likeness occur in more contexts than 
just advertising and endorsements. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, (3d Cir. 
2013) (“Appellant’s claims stemmed from Appellee’s alleged use of his likeness and 
biographical information in its NCAA Football series of videogames.”); Comedy III 
Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 800–01 (Cal. 2001) (“Saderup sold 
lithographs and T-shirts bearing a likeness of The Three Stooges reproduced from a 
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sume that the advertiser’s interest is a purely economic one. That 
hardly disqualifies him from protection under the First Amend-
ment.”130 
Commercial speech is speech that does “no more than propose 
a commercial transaction.”131 Even in the context of commercial 
speech, though, the First Amendment often erects a formidable 
barrier. At a minimum, the government must show: that the com-
mercial speech restriction is supported by a substantial state inter-
est; that the restriction advances the substantial state interest; and 
that the restriction is narrowly tailored to the substantial state in-
terest.132 As the Supreme Court has noted, “[t]he regulatory tech-
nique [restricting commercial speech] may extend only as far as the 
interest it serves. The State cannot regulate speech that poses no 
danger to the asserted state interest, nor can it completely suppress 
information when narrower restrictions on expression would serve 
its interest as well.”133 
The Supreme Court has indicated that commercial speech re-
strictions that are not false or misleading are subject to scrutiny 
stricter than the intermediate level of scrutiny just described.134 
“[W]hen a State entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful, 
non-misleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the 
preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is far less reason to 
depart from the rigorous review that the First Amendment general-
                                                                                                                            
charcoal drawing he had made. These lithographs and T-shirts did not constitute an 
advertisement, endorsement, or sponsorship of any product.”). 
130 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 762 (1976). 
131 Id. 
132 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 
557, 564 (1980) (“The limitation on expression must be designed carefully to achieve the 
State’s goal. Compliance with this requirement may be measured by two criteria. First, 
the restriction must directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation may not be 
sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government’s purpose. 
Second, if the governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction 
on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive.”). 
133 Id. at 565 (internal citations omitted). 
134 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (“The mere fact 
that messages propose commercial transactions does not in and of itself dictate the 
constitutional analysis that should apply to decisions to suppress them.”). 
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ly demands.”135 Then, the exclusive realm of the right of publici-
ty—nonprivate, nondeceptive uses of a person’s name or like-
ness—might be treated by a court as subject to the same “rigorous 
review that the First Amendment generally demands,”136 even if 
the use is commercial. 
Because of an unusual procedural posture, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit was recently forced to devote an en-
tire opinion to whether the use of Michael Jordan’s name was a 
commercial use in a case claiming violations of the Lanham Act and 
the Illinois right of publicity.137 In Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, the 
grocery store chain defendant published a full page image in a spe-
cial commemorative edition of Sports Illustrated, congratulating 
Michael Jordan on being inducted in to the hall of fame.138 The de-
fendant agreed to offer the magazine for sale in its stores in the 
Chicago area, in exchange for a full page of advertising space in the 
magazine.139 The ad showed a pair of Jordan’s sneakers, congratu-
lated a “fellow Chicagoan,” and indicated that Jordan was “a shoe 
in” for the hall of fame.140 Of course, the Defendant’s logo was 
prominently featured below the congratulatory message. The Se-
venth Circuit found Jewel’s speech to be commercial, and re-
manded the case for further proceedings, noting that the Supreme 
Court of the United States “has not strayed from its commercial-
speech jurisprudence despite calls for it to do so.”141 
                                                                                                                            
135 Id.; see also id. at 502–03 (“It is the State’s interest in protecting consumers from 
‘commercial harms’ that provides ‘the typical reason why commercial speech can be 
subject to greater governmental regulation than noncommercial speech.’ Yet bans that 
target truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages rarely protect consumers from such 
harms. Instead, such bans often serve only to obscure an ‘underlying governmental 
policy’ that could be implemented without regulating speech.”) (citations omitted). 
136 Id. at 485. 
137 See Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d 509, 513 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he 
district court agreed with Jewel that the ad was noncommercial speech and sought further 
briefing on the implications of that classification. Jewel maintained that the commercial-
speech ruling conclusively defeated all of Jordan’s claims. Jordan agreed, accepting 
Jewel’s position that the First Amendment provided a complete defense.”). 
138 Id. at 511. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 512. 
141 Id. at 515–16. 
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Although the Supreme Court of the United States has not 
abandoned the commercial/noncommercial speech distinction in 
First Amendment jurisprudence,142 that doctrine has been serious-
ly eroded by legal scholars.143 The commercial nature of a use lost 
at least some of its pull in a Supreme Court opinion in the context 
of copyright and fair use in a famous case invoking 2Live Crew’s 
reuse of part of Roy Orbison’s classic song “Pretty Woman.”144 
                                                                                                                            
142 See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2639, 189 L. Ed. 2d 620 (2014) (making a 
finding of noncommercial speech but determining that the noncommercial speech 
determination is not dispositive because the state action could not even survive 
intermediate scrutiny); see also Jordan, 743 F.3d at 522. 
143 DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 6.9 (2012); 
See Ronald A. Cass, Commercial Speech, Constitutionalism, Collective Choice, 56 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1317, 1317 (1988) (explaining that “virtually every commentator writing about the 
first amendment believes that the [Supreme] Court’s treatment of commercial speech is 
wrong”); Sean P. Costello, Comment, Strange Brew: the State of Commercial Speech 
Jurisprudence Before and After 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
681, 682 (1997) (explaining that commercial speech is “in a state of constitutional 
limbo”); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. 
REV. 627, 628 (1990) (writing that the “commercial/noncommercial distinction makes no 
sense”); David F. McGowan, Comment, A Critical Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78 
CALIF. L. REV. 359, 360–61 (1990) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
commercial speech as inconsistent and incoherent); Thomas W. Merrill, First Amendment 
Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 
205, 206 (1976) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s rulings in commercial speech cases 
“may be difficult for lower courts to apply consistently”); Robert M. O’Neil, Nike v. 
Kasky—What Might Have Been . . ., 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1259, 1259–60 (2004) 
(contending that Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554 gave the Court an opportunity to 
clarify the “increasingly confusing” commercial speech doctrine); Robert Post, The 
Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (2000) (describing the 
commercial speech doctrine as “a notoriously unstable and contentious domain of First 
Amendment jurisprudence”); Daniel E. Troy, Advertising: Not “Low Value” Speech, 16 
YALE J. ON REG. 85, 92 (1999) (writing that “a lack of clarity continues to mark” 
commercial speech jurisprudence); Brian J. Waters, Comment, A Doctrine in Disarray: 
Why the First Amendment Demands the Abandonment of the Central Hudson Test for 
Commercial Speech, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1626, 1634 (1997) (criticizing the “lack of 
clarity” surrounding commercial speech law); Nancy J. Whitmore, Facing the Fear: A Free 
Market Approach for Economic Expression, 17 COMM. L. & POL’Y 21, 31 (2012) (citing 
Mitchell N. Berman, Commercial Speech and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: A 
Second Look at “The Greater Includes the Lesser”, 55 VAND. L. REV. 693, 701 (2002) 
(concluding that the Court’s commercial speech doctrine is “confused and unstable”)). 
144 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994). Lower courts 
seem to continue to engage in a commercial nature of the use inquiry. See Barton Beebe, 
An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
549, 598 (2008) (“[O]f the 306 [lower court] opinions, 84.0% explicitly considered 
210 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:181 
 
One of the specific statutory factors which courts examine is “the 
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.”145 All 
but rejecting the value of the statutory commercial use inquiry, Jus-
tice Souter, writing for the majority in Campbell, quoted Samuel 
Johnson that “[n]o man but a blockhead ever wrote, except for 
money.”146 Justice Souter’s opinion in Campbell emphasized that 
the commercial nature of a use was but one factor to be balanced in 
the fair use inquiry,147 correcting the court’s previous ruling in So-
ny Corp. that “every commercial use of copyrighted material is pre-
sumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege.”148 
Several commentators take the position that the statutory fair use 
factors in copyright law, including the commercial nature prong, 
have been entirely displaced by a “transformative use” or “pro-
ductive use” inquiry.149 
One cannot ignore the fact that the commercial speech doctrine 
is still the law of the land. In the context of the right of publicity, 
the doctrine makes it very unlikely that a teenager tweeting “Paris 
Hilton is so cool” would be liable for a right of publicity claim. This 
is a good outcome. While the line between a commercial use and a 
noncommercial use in the context of artistic, literary, and critical 
                                                                                                                            
whether the use was commercial or noncommercial in nature under factor one, while only 
38.2% explicitly considered the transformativeness of the defendant’s use under the 
factor.”). The years following Beebe’s study, however, have shown a significant increase 
in the transformative use inquiry. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 
15 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 715, 755 (2011) (Of unreversed district court preliminary 
injunctions, bench trials, and crossed motions for summary judgment during 1995-2000, 
70.45% of courts considered the transformative nature of the use, compared to 95.83% 
during 2005-2010). 
145 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012). 
146 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584. 
147 See id. at 590. 
148 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984). 
149 See Netanel, supra, note 144, at 755. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 
569, 579 (1994) (“[T]he goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally 
furthered by the creation of transformative works.”); Hofheinz v. Discovery Commc’ns, 
Inc., 2001 WL 1111970 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2001) (“Although ‘transformativeness’ is 
primarily analyzed in connection with the first fair use factor, it forms the basis of the 
entire fair use analysis.”); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 1105, 1106–07 (1990). 
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works might be blurry, it is plain that the tweet just described is 
noncommercial. Heightened speech protection for that type of 
plainly noncommercial speech encourages the free exchange of 
ideas. The next section will discuss the convergence of courts and 
scholars in working other First Amendment limitations in to the 
right of publicity through the transformative use test and the 
newsworthiness exemption. 
IV. THE PROPER SCOPE OF THE RIGHT OF 
PUBLICITY 
A properly delineated right of publicity is one that comports 
with First Amendment principles, and extends only as far as the 
natural rights that support its existence. The following sections 
operationalize those principles. 
A. The Emerging First Amendment Balancing Tests: The 
Transformative Use Test and the Newsworthiness Exemption 
There is no settled, structured legal framework for evaluating 
right of publicity claims—including for balancing the right of pub-
licity with the First Amendment.150 Much of the case law is irre-
concilable with itself and the First Amendment.151 Moreover, there 
is significant variation among the states in defining the scope of the 
right of publicity.152 Indeed, the uncertainty associated with liability 
                                                                                                                            
150 To date, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken only one case focused on the right of 
publicity. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578–79 (1977) 
(broadcasting company infringed the “human cannonball’s” right of publicity when it 
broadcast his entire act on a news program). One seemingly-settled First Amendment 
exception to the right of publicity is the “newsworthiness exception,” discussed infra. 
151 See Adam Liptak, When it May Not Pay to Be Famous, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/02/sunday-review/between-the-first-amendment-
and-right-of-publicity.html?smid=tw-share (“The courts have, on the one hand, rejected 
right-of-publicity suits arising from a painting of Tiger Woods, a comic book evoking the 
musicians Johnny and Edgar Winter, parody baseball trading cards and a fantasy baseball 
game that used the names, statistics and biographies of Major League players. But courts 
have allowed suits over the broadcast of a human cannonball’s entire act, a comic book 
using a hockey player’s nickname, an ad evoking Vanna White’s skill at turning letters on 
‘The Wheel of Fortune’ and a reference to Rosa Parks in a song . . . . If there is a legal 
principle that unites these rulings, it is hard to discern.”). 
152 See infra Section IV.B. 
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stemming from the right of publicity is potentially chilling 
speech.153 There is, however, an emerging consensus among courts 
that the use of an individual’s name or likeness should be allowed 
when that use is transformative or newsworthy. We agree with this 
emerging consensus. 
In keeping with this rule, courts should ensure that the use is 
not protected by the First Amendment’s freedom of the press 
clause.154 This is a routine and established practice. Courts general-
ly apply the “newsworthiness” test where an individual’s name or 
likeness is used in relation to a matter of public interest.155 
If the use is not newsworthy, courts should apply the transfor-
mative use test to balance the right of publicity with the First 
Amendment. The transformative use test asks “whether a product 
containing a celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has be-
come primarily the defendant’s own expression rather than the ce-
lebrity’s likeness.”156 Put another way, a court will ask “whether 
the celebrity likeness is one of the ‘raw materials’ from which an 
original work is synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation 
of the celebrity is the very sum and substance of the work in ques-
tion.”157 
The transformative use test is widely used by courts attempting 
to balance the right of publicity with the First Amendment.158 
                                                                                                                            
153 Electronic Arts ceased production of its popular video game NCAA Football in the 
face of legal challenges to the game’s use of the likeness of college football players. Steve 
Berkowitz, EA Drops Football in ‘14, Settles Cases as NCAA Fights, USA TODAY, Sept. 26, 
2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/09/26/ea-sports-ncaa-13-
video-game-keller-obannon/2878307/. 
154 “Congress shall make no law  . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. I. Matters of public interest are deemed newsworthy and subject to 
First Amendment protection. See Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409 (Ct. 
App. 1983); Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing & Publ’g, 94 N.Y.2d 436, 446-47, 727 
N.E.2d 549, 555 (2000); Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996); 
Finger v. Omni Publ’g Intern. 566 N.E.2d 141 (N.Y. 1990); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. 
Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).  
155 See supra note 154. 
156 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 2001). 
157 Id. 
158 See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013) (adopting the transformative 
use test and citing to a long line of cases adopting the test). 
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Transformative use applies even in the presence of a commercial 
motivation.159 The transformative use test is elegant and relatively 
simple to understand, especially when compared to the Rogers 
test—another test endorsed by many courts and scholars. The Rog-
ers test would permit a right of publicity action only if the use of an 
individual’s identity was wholly unrelated to the underlying work or 
was simply a disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of 
goods or services.160 The Rogers test seems to protect First 
Amendment principles at the expense of the natural rights an indi-
vidual possesses in her identity. In the words of the Third Circuit, 
the Rogers test “is a blunt instrument, unfit for widespread applica-
tion in cases that require a carefully calibrated balancing of two 
fundamental protections: the right of free expression and the right 
to control, manage, and profit from one’s own identity.”161 
By contrast, the transformative use test takes into account im-
portant First Amendment principles. It protects speech when the 
speaker contributes to the marketplace of ideas. Conversely, it al-
lows individuals to assert natural rights in their identity when 
speech does not contribute to the marketplace of ideas, but merely 
free rides on an individual’s identity. That applying the transfor-
mative use test to a difficult set of facts in Hart led to a 2–1 decision 
may be viewed as evidence that the transformative use test effec-
tively balances the competing concerns of natural rights in one’s 
name and likeness and the First Amendment. 
Uses of an individual’s name or likeness that are wholly unre-
lated to a matter of public interest or creative expression cannot be 
said to be transformative or newsworthy. Importantly, the high de-
gree of deference given to defendants under the Rogers test would 
allow an array of ex post justifications for an infringing use. Uses of 
an individual’s name or likeness that are largely unrelated to a mat-
ter of public interest or creative expression are most likely not 
                                                                                                                            
159 Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994) (explaining that in the 
context of copyright law, “the mere fact that a use is educational and not for profit does 
not insulate it from a finding of infringement, any more than the commercial character of 
a use bars a finding of fairness”). 
160 See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1005 (2d Cir. 1989). 
161 See Hart, 717 F.3d at 157. 
214 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:181 
 
transformative or newsworthy; they do not contribute to the mar-
ketplace of ideas. Because the wholly unrelated standard would al-
low such uses, the Rogers test provides insufficient protection to 
right of publicity plaintiffs. 
There are still lessons to take from the Rogers test. A less ex-
treme standard applying the same principles driving the Rogers test 
would appropriately balance the right of publicity and the First 
Amendment. Courts allow newsworthy and transformative uses of 
intellectual property because those uses contribute to the market 
place of ideas; because those uses benefit society in some way. The 
important part is the nexus between: (1) the use; and (2) the crea-
tive expression (transformation), or the matter of public interest 
(newsworthiness). The problem with the Rogers test is that it allows 
defendants to avoid liability under the right of publicity with de mi-
nimis transformation or newsworthiness. 
Courts, then, should allow right of publicity claims to survive 
where a plaintiff can show that the defendant’s use of an individu-
al’s name or likeness had no real relationship to a creative expres-
sion or a matter of public interest—put another way, where there is 
no transformation or newsworthiness of the person’s name or like-
ness. Of course, both the transformative use test and the newswor-
thiness exceptions are subject to judicial discretion. Balancing 
competing concerns—within the proper framework—is precisely 
the job of the judiciary. By giving judges properly guided discre-
tion, allowing uses of an individual’s name or likeness that are 
transformative or newsworthy achieves an ideal balance between 
natural rights in individual identity and the “important counter-
vailing social policy” of free speech.162 
B. The Right of Publicity Should Be Limited After Death 
The right of publicity should end with a person’s death, or soon 
thereafter. That is not quite the case under current law. “The 
overwhelming majority rule under either statute or common law is 
that the right of publicity is descendible property and has a post-
mortem duration which is not conditioned on lifetime exploita-
                                                                                                                            
162 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14 § 2:1. 
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tion.”163 A total of twenty states have expressly adopted “a post-
mortem right of publicity: 14 by statute and six by common law.”164 
Very few courts have simply rejected a postmortem right of public-
ity at common law, and when courts have, some states have reacted 
by passing statutes to make the right of publicity descendible.165 In 
fact, only New York and Wisconsin have flatly rejected the post-
mortem right of publicity, limiting the right to “living persons.”166 
Yet, while at least thirty-one states167 have adopted the right of 
publicity in some form, only twenty states have recognized the 
right of publicity as a descendible right.168 Other states simply have 
yet to consider whether the right of publicity is descendible.169 
While the trend of those that have considered the issue leans heavi-
ly towards a postmortem right of publicity, there is no trend as to 
                                                                                                                            
163 2 id. § 9:17. 
164 Id. § 9:18. 
165 Id. (“Only one appellate court has clearly and unequivocally considered, weighed, 
and rejected any postmortem right of publicity. This is the federal Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in its 1980 decision in [Memphis Development], opining as to Tennessee common 
law. The law in Tennessee was subsequently changed by statute and by court decision. In 
California, while one possible interpretation of the 1979 Lugosi decision was that there 
was never any postmortem right of publicity under any circumstances, that implication 
was later changed by the 1985 California statute. In Ohio, while a 1983 federal court 
decision had held that Ohio did not recognize a postmortem duration, that was changed 
by Ohio’s 1999 enactment of a postmortem right of publicity statute.”) (citations 
omitted). 
166 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (“A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising 
purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person 
without having first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or 
her parent or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor.”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.50 (West) 
(providing civil penalties for “[t]he use, for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade, 
of the name, portrait or picture of any living person.”); Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Print. 
& Pub., 94 N.Y.2d 436, 441, 727 N.E.2d 549, 552 (2000) (Even though section 51, 
providing for civil penalties, does not explicitly apply only to living persons, New York 
courts have consistently “recogniz[ed] the Legislature’s pointed objective in enacting 
sections 50 and 51, [and] underscored that the statute is to be narrowly construed and 
‘strictly limited to nonconsensual commercial appropriations of the name, portrait or 
picture of a living person.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
167 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 6:3. 
168 See 2 id. § § 9:17–9:18. 
169 See Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imports & Exports, Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 326 (6th 
Cir. 2001) (“Given the number of states that are agnostic as to the issue of a post-mortem 
right of publicity it may be something of an overstatement to state that sixteen states 
constitute an ‘overwhelming majority rule.’”). 
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the duration of that right. These statutes “define varying durations 
for the postmortem right, ranging from 100 years, 75 years, 70 
years, 60 years, 50 years, 40 years, 30 years, 20 years, as long as 
continuously used, or no stated duration.”170 
There are reasonable arguments that the right of publicity seen 
as a natural right should die with the individual,171 and reasonable 
arguments that the right of publicity should survive the individu-
al.172 Westfall and Landau have questioned whether referring to the 
right of publicity as property (the “property syllogism”) helps shed 
light on the debate and proper policy response.173 Certainly, this 
Article agrees with Professor Armstrong’s assertion that 
“[c]haracterization of a value as property does not solve the ques-
tion of content of this right.”174 
As Jennifer Rothman noted, the discomfort 
with alienating publicity rights reveals an undeve-
loped, but very much present, concern that—even if 
rooted in property—the right of publicity should 
have limits placed on its alienability. In some sense 
then, it is scholars who have seen things in black and 
white, while the courts in the trenches have taken a 
more nuanced approach, albeit an underdeveloped 
and unacknowledged one.175 
The differing willingness to recognize the right of publicity as 
descendible, or to grant varying durations of the right, might be ex-
plained by certain jurists conceiving of the right of publicity as an 
intellectual property right and certain jurists conceiving of the right 
of publicity as a natural right. 
The principal historical antecedent to the right of publicity,176 
the right of privacy, is not descendible.177 This comports with an 
                                                                                                                            
170 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 9:18 (citations omitted). 
171 See Hoffman, supra note 84, at 133., 
172 See, e.g., Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, The Descendibility of the Right of 
Publicity: Is There Commercial Life After Death?, 89 YALE L.J. 1125 (1980). 
173 See Westfall & Landau, supra note 21, at 72. 
174 Armstrong, supra note 6, at 465. 
175 Jennifer E. Rothman, The Inalienable Right of Publicity, 101 GEO. L.J. 185, 205 (2012). 
176 See generally Warren & Brandeis, supra note 13. 
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understanding of the right of privacy as a natural right: a right so 
inextricably intertwined with the human to whom the right be-
longs, that it must cease to exist when that human ceases to exist. 
The mental and physical suffering allegedly caused by an invasion 
of privacy simply cannot exist after that human has died.178 
Intellectual property rights, on the other hand, may continue 
beyond the death of the linked individual or organization.179 This 
includes trademark rights, which continue indefinitely, so long as 
the mark is used in commerce.180 Trademarks continue to be pro-
tected so long as they are used in commerce because consumers 
benefit from decreased transaction costs and increased quality so 
long as the mark is being used in commerce. Having already re-
jected the use of trademark rationales in defining the scope of the 
right of publicity, we submit that such rationales likewise cannot 
support an argument that the right of publicity should be descendi-
ble. 
As with privacy, the underlying motivation for the right of pub-
licity—natural rights—ceases to exist when the human that owns 
the right ceases to exist. It would seem absurd to argue that heirs or 
assignees should be given an autonomous right to define the perso-
na of someone else, who happens to be deceased. The choice to 
lead a life of solitude or a life of publicity is also not compelling 
when applied to a dead person. Heirs and assignees cannot assert 
“the notion that my identity is mine—it is my property to control 
                                                                                                                            
177 See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 9:1 (“There is no dispute as to the postmortem 
rule for traditional ‘privacy’ rights which protect human dignitary values, damage to 
which is measured by mental and physical suffering and damage to reputation. Such 
classic ‘privacy’ rights die with the person whose privacy was allegedly invaded. Both the 
commentators and the cases unanimously support this rule.”). 
178 See id. 
179 See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012) (“Copyright in a work created on or after January 1, 
1978, subsists from its creation and, except as provided by the following subsections, 
endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the author’s 
death.”); De la Vergne Refrigerating Mach. Co. v. Featherstone, 147 U.S. 209, 230 
(1893) (holding that patent rights pass to patent holder’s estate). 
180 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (“A mark shall be deemed to be ‘abandoned’ if  . . . its use 
has been discontinued with intent not to resume such use. Intent not to resume may be 
inferred from circumstances. Nonuse for 3 consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence 
of abandonment. ‘Use’ of a mark means the bona fide use of such mark made in the 
ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.”). 
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as I see fit.”181 Moreover, in situations involving the disclosure of 
private facts postmortem, the right of publicity could be used to 
circumvent and frustrate well-established law that privacy rights 
die with the individual. 
There are, however, two compelling motivations for restricting 
the use of an individual’s name or likeness that may still be compel-
ling after the death of that individual: the allocative efficiency ra-
tionale and the deception-based rationales. These two rationales 
only make sense as applied to famous or notable individuals. For 
deception—consumer confusion—to exist, consumers must rec-
ognize the individual; this occurs only in the context of famous or 
notable individuals. Similarly, the allocative efficiency rationale 
applies most forcefully where resources are scarce; nonfamous in-
dividuals are not a scarce resource.182 
Although not settled law, § 1125(a) of the Lanham Act183 may 
be available to estates and heirs of famous and notable individuals. 
Such a claim would allege that a defendant’s use caused confusion 
such that members of the public believed the estate or heirs autho-
rized a use of the deceased’s name or likeness. This would allow 
for allocative efficiencies and punish deceptive uses of a deceased 
and famous individual’s name or likeness. 
15. U.S.C. § 1125(a) provides: 
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any 
goods or services, or any container for goods, uses 
in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or de-
vice, or any combination thereof, or any false desig-
nation of origin, false or misleading description of 
fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, 
which— 
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, 
or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or as-
sociation of such person with another person, or as 
to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her 
                                                                                                                            
181 See 1 MCCARTHY supra note 14, § 2:1. 
182 See Baird supra, note 73, at 414. 
183 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012). 
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goods, services, or commercial activities by another 
person, or 
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misre-
presents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or 
geographic origin of his or her or another person’s 
goods, services, or commercial activities, 
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who be-
lieves that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by 
such act.184  
“Section 1125(a) thus creates two distinct bases of liability: 
false association, § 1125(a)(1)(A), and false advertising, 
§ 1125(a)(1)(B).”185 The United States Supreme Court recently 
directly addressed in Lexmark the issue of standing under the false 
advertising prong of § 1125, holding “[t]o invoke the Lanham Act’s 
cause of action for false advertising, a plaintiff must plead (and ul-
timately prove) an injury to a commercial interest in sales or busi-
ness reputation proximately caused by the defendant’s misrepre-
sentations.”186 In reaching that conclusion, the court engaged in a 
two-step inquiry: (1) whether the plaintiff fell within the zone of 
interest of § 1125; and (2) whether plaintiff’s injury was proximate-
ly caused by a violation of § 1125?187 
While this Article cannot identify a case on point since Lex-
mark, there are several examples of instances where lower courts 
have allowed a Lanham Act false association claim to be asserted by 
an estate.188 One district court in California concluded that “[b]y 
                                                                                                                            
184 Id. 
185 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1384 (2014). 
186 Id. at 1395. 
187 See id. at 1388. 
188 See Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1018 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[B]ecause 
Facenda’s voice is a distinctive mark, the Estate owns the mark, and [defendant’s use of 
that mark] allegedly creates a likelihood of confusion that Facenda’s Estate [endorsed the 
product.]); Cheever v. Acad. Chi., Ltd., 690 F. Supp. 281, 288, 88 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) 
(noting no apparent impediment to author John Cheever’s survivors’ § 43(a) claims and 
commenting that potential financial motive would not undermine claim based on literary 
reputation of deceased); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1375–76 (D.N.J. 
1981) (concluding facts supporting finding of likelihood of confusion also supported 
§ 43(a) claims brought by Elvis Presley’s estate); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. 
Supp. 426, 433 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (assuming without comment that estate and assignees of 
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using the term ‘another person’ [in § 1125(a)], Congress selected 
language broad enough to encompass a claim by a deceased celebri-
ty’s Estate or by any celebrity’s assignee.”189 Whether or not the 
estates and heirs of celebrities have standing under § 1125 is an is-
sue the higher courts may address in the future. For now, it seems 
quite feasible for such an estate to assert a § 1125 false association 
claim. This might obviate the need for a descendible right of public-
ity, as § 1125 could ensure the efficient allocation of resources and 
prevent consumer deception. 
This Article does not endorse the notion that an estate should 
be able, as a matter of policy, to assert a § 1125 false association 
claim in perpetuity. That may be a result of the application of 
§ 1125 standing for estates of deceased, famous individuals.190 If 
courts do not ultimately find such standing under § 1125, the Au-
thors do not take the view that a postmortem right of publicity is 
necessarily suboptimal policy, but in such a case the right should be 
limited in duration to no more than ten years. This would provide a 
reasonable “cool down” period for estates to prevent the onslaught 
of uses that would otherwise inevitably ensue with the recent death 
of a famous individual.191  
                                                                                                                            
Agatha Christie could bring a § 43(a) false endorsement claim, but dismissing it because 
there was no likelihood of confusion). 
189 Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1032 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
190 Nor does this Article endorse the notion that § 1125 should displace the right of 
publicity. See Barbara A. Solomon, Can the Lanham Act Protect Tiger Woods? An Analysis of 
Whether the Lanham Act is a Proper Substitute for a Federal Right of Publicity, 94 
TRADEMARK REP. 1202, 1228 (2004) (“To those who resist a federal right of publicity law 
because they believe that the Lanham Act provides sufficient coverage, the case law does 
not bear this out. The Lanham Act does not protect against misappropriation of one’s 
likeness, nor should it, given the different interests protected by the Lanham Act and by 
state right of publicity laws. To those who believe that a federal right of publicity statute 
would improperly intrude on First Amendment interests, this too is not borne out by the 
existing law, which recognizes a strong and rigorous First Amendment defense to right of 
publicity claims. If there is a consensus that one’s persona should be protected from 
unauthorized commercial use (and the fact that a majority of states have enacted a statute 
suggests there is), a federal statute to protect the right of publicity may be the only way to 
accomplish that goal. Clearly, the Lanham Act in its current incarnation is not a proper 
substitute.”). 
191 Rothman, supra note 175, at 240 (“[T]he durational limit for a postmortem right of 
publicity that might be the most appropriate is one that grants heirs only a limited 
2014] FAME, PROPERTY, AND IDENTITY 221 
 
The exact scope of the postmortem right of publicity is not as 
important as the principle that the postmortem right should be li-
mited in duration and reach.192 Whether § 1125, a reasonable cool 
down period, or a non-descendible right provides that limitation is 
a matter we will leave for courts and legislatures. 
C. The Right of Publicity Should be Limited to Enumerated 
Natural Characteristics 
The scope of the right of publicity recognized by some courts 
today confuses protecting an individual’s natural rights with pro-
tecting consumers from deception. The generally accepted test 
used to establish an infringement of the right of publicity is wheth-
er or not the plaintiff is “identifiable.”193 We support this test, but 
the ill-defined scope of identity allows plaintiffs to assert the right 
of publicity when a use does not make use of the plaintiff’s identity 
in a way that affects her natural rights.194 The right of publicity 
should only be actionable where a Plaintiff’s name or visual like-
ness—the extent of the individual’s natural rights—are identifia-
ble.195 
                                                                                                                            
postdeath period of rights in which the dignity interests of the survivors are most at issue 
and the impact on pre-death incentives is likely to be greatest.”). 
192 See id. at 241 (“In the context of postmortem rights, the countervailing public 
interest in using a deceased person’s image will weigh more strongly against the interests 
of the heirs or devisees. Accordingly, countervailing speech and liberty interests will more 
often limit enforcement of publicity rights than in the context of inter vivos rights.”). 
193 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 3:18 (“Right of publicity case law routinely states that 
plaintiff must plead and prove that defendant’s use ‘identifies’ plaintiff.”). 
194 See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler v. Ford 
Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462–63 (9th Cir. 1988) (Advertiser hired singer to mimic 
Midler’s voice once Midler refused to participate in advertisement.); Carson v. Here’s 
Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 833 (6th Cir. 1983). 
195 Several lawsuits, some successful and some failures, demonstrate the absurdity that 
ensues when plaintiffs are allowed to assert the right of publicity based on the 
identifiability of something other than the plaintiff’s name or visual likeness. See Oliveira 
v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 64 (2d Cir. 2001) (singer claims violation of right of 
publicity when defendant uses musical composition that singer made famous); White v. 
Samsung Elecs. Am., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992); Carson, 698 F.2d at 839; 
Robinson v. HSBC Bank USA, 732 F. Supp. 2d 976, 983 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (plaintiff 
claimed violation of right of publicity when Defendant publishes picture of plaintiff’s 
house, because Plaintiff and his house are so closely associated); Leopold v. Levin, 259 
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As noted above, the scope of the right of publicity that we are 
advocating for recognizes that the right of publicity does have what 
may seem a dual purpose. Normatively, it is rooted in the right to 
protect (up to a point) one’s identity; the right of publicity exists 
because there are instances where the right of privacy and decep-
tion-based restrictions do not adequately protect rights in a per-
son’s identity. For example, in the case of the unauthorized use of 
an accurate picture of a previously non-famous individual in adver-
tisement, the right of publicity functions as an extension of priva-
cy.196 In other similar cases, the right allows a celebrity to manage 
commercial exploitation of her fame such as: the unauthorized T-
shirts depicting celebrities in a life-like manner;197 the unlicensed 
television broadcast of a performer’s entire act;198 and a use such as 
“Famous baseball pitcher Sam Spade may be the best in the league, 
but he has never tasted HIGH FIVE sports drink. Why don’t 
you?”199 
Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores200 provides an excellent example of 
a situation where deception and privacy based restrictions would 
not provide a viable cause of action: it is very unlikely for consum-
ers to be confused in to thinking that Michael Jordan sponsored or 
endorsed Jewel Food Stores based upon Jewel Food Stores’ adver-
tisement congratulating Michael Jordan for being inducted into the 
hall of fame.201 Nor is Jordan’s induction in to the hall of fame pri-
vate information. 
In such instances, the right of publicity serves to protect an in-
dividual’s rights in their identity. Put differently, it allows individ-
uals to exercise their autonomous right of self-definition. It allows 
                                                                                                                            
N.E.2d 250 (1970) (convicted murderer’s right of publicity claim failed against book and 
movie authors based on the convicted murder’s story). 
196 See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902). 
197 See Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 800–01. 
198 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977). 
199 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 28:14. 
200 743 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2014). 
201 See id. at 522 (“We note that the lone federal claim in the suit—a false-endorsement 
claim under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)—requires proof that Jewel’s 
congratulatory ad caused a likelihood of confusion that Jordan was a Jewel–Osco sponsor 
or endorsed its products and services.”). 
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for a life of solitude or a life of publicity. As noted earlier, it is diffi-
cult to imagine how asserting the right of publicity in any of the 
contexts just given benefits the public because the public is not pro-
tected—from being confused as to sponsorship or otherwise. The 
normative underpinning that this Article suggests is narrow but 
different: the right of publicity is based in a property-like right in 
one’s name and likeness. That is the state’s substantial interest. 
One should be allowed to assert that natural right so long as it 
yields to “important countervailing social polic[ies] which negate[] 
this natural impulse of justice”202—here, the First Amendment. 
We have chosen an individual’s name (including using signa-
ture as a name) and likeness as the extent of the natural rights in 
her identity partly because those are the two most important, im-
mutable characteristics of identity. One could reasonably argue that 
voice is another one of those important, immutable characteristics 
that should be included in an individual’s natural rights.203 We do 
not think including voice in the concept of identity for the right of 
publicity would necessarily be bad policy. Individuals often work 
                                                                                                                            
202 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 2:1. 
203 See Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(Kennedy, J. dissenting) (“I do not believe that the common law right of publicity may be 
extended beyond an individual’s name, likeness, achievements, identifying characteristics 
or actual performances, to include phrases or other things which are merely associated 
with the individual, as is the phrase “Here’s Johnny.” The majority’s extension of the 
right of publicity to include phrases or other things which are merely associated with the 
individual permits a popular entertainer or public figure, by associating himself or herself 
with a common phrase, to remove those words from the public domain.”); White v. 
Samsung Elecs., Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The term ‘likeness’ 
refers to a visual image not a vocal imitation.” (citing Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 
460 (9th Cir. 1988))); White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 
1993) (“Once the right of publicity is extended beyond specific physical characteristics, 
this will become a recurring problem: Outside name, likeness and voice, the things that 
most reliably remind the public of celebrities are the actions or roles they’re famous for. A 
commercial with an astronaut setting foot on the moon would evoke the image of Neil 
Armstrong. Any masked man on horseback would remind people (over a certain age) of 
Clayton Moore. And any number of songs—“My Way,” “Yellow Submarine,” “Like a 
Virgin,” “Beat It,” “Michael, Row the Boat Ashore,” to name only a few—instantly 
evoke an image of the person or group who made them famous, regardless of who is 
singing.”); Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1286 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The right of 
publicity, as defined by the state courts, is limited to using a celebrity’s name, voice, face 
or signature.”) (citations omitted). 
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hard at crafting their voice to sound a certain way, and like the 
trademark holder who works hard to establish a brand, a Lanham 
act claim will protect most, if not all, “voice appropriation” 
claims.204 This then changes the test: The distinct sound of an in-
dividual’s voice, the unique fashion sense of an individual, or the 
bubbly personality of an individual are all choices that individual’s 
make, and other individuals should be free to make similar choices, 
unless there is consumer confusion. 
In the United States, these choices are generally outside the 
scope of natural rights. Intellectual property protections in the 
United States are motivated by utilitarian concerns, not natural or 
moral rights, and the boundaries of the rights dictate the incentives 
the United States offers. In the context of copyright and patent law, 
this utilitarian motivation is present in the Constitution: [t]o pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for li-
mited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”205 Similarly, trademark law 
is primarily motivated by decreasing transaction costs and ensuring 
accountability, hence its normative roots in consumer protec-
tion.206 
As a general matter, the United States rejects the notion that 
inventors, authors, and brand owners should be granted protection 
of their respective discoveries, writings, and business reputations 
or symbols because their work product is part of their personhood. 
The right of publicity, on the other hand, exists precisely to reify 
and commoditize the concept of personhood. The right of publicity 
is not a simple alternative to fill doctrinal gaps left by the Lanham 
Act and similar laws, where neither the utilitarian concern of pre-
venting consumer confusion, nor natural rights in an individual’s 
identity are present.207 Instead, the right of publicity should be de-
                                                                                                                            
204 Carson, 698 F.2d at 839 (Kennedy, J. dissenting) (“The existence of a cause of 
action under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (1976) and Michigan 
common law does much to undercut the need for policing against unfair competition 
through an additional legal remedy such as the right of publicity.”). 
205 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
206 Supra, Section II.C. 
207 Policy decisions have already been made by the Lanham Act and other related laws 
and those decisions should govern the limits of the use of name or likeness where natural 
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lineated to effect its true purpose: to protect rights in an individu-
al’s identity, whether unwanted fame or management of the com-
mercial exploitation of a person’s fame in cases where no consumer 
deception is present. We believe those rights, which one could call 
“natural,” should extend to name and visual likeness, though per-
haps a case can be made that they should extend to a limited num-
ber of other enumerated natural characteristics, such as voice. 
Finally, we suggest that a federal legislative solution208 could be 
most appropriate to: (a) create a level playing field for the right of 
publicity which varies in scope and duration among the various 
states; (b) distinguish its purpose from trademark law; and (c) set 
proper limits in particular as to which characteristics can be pro-
tected, all against the backdrop of First Amendment considera-
tions. 
CONCLUSION 
Conceiving the right of publicity as a derivative of or related to 
trademark law has led to serious errors by courts and commenta-
tors. It may even be a misnomer to label the right of publicity as a 
species of intellectual property. Any argument that the right of 
publicity somehow incentivizes individuals to pursue laudable ca-
reers is as disingenuous as the argument that the public benefits 
from a celebrity’s ability to sue for monetary damages when a per-
son or entity makes a non-private, non-deceptive use of an individ-
ual’s likeness. The right of publicity should be delineated to effec-
tuate its limited but legitimate purpose: to protect an individual’s 
natural rights in her identity. 
                                                                                                                            
rights are not affected. We recognize, however that the Lanham Act only sets a floor of 
liability, and states may offer heightened protection. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, 
§ 22:2 (“The federal Lanham Act does not occupy the field of trademark and unfair 
competition law in such a way that it would preempt parallel state law.”). 
208 Many have called for a federal right of publicity in the past. See Eric J. Goodman, A 
National Identity Crisis: The Need for A Federal Right of Publicity Statute, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. 
ART & ENT. L. 227 (1999); Sean D. Whaley, “I’m A Highway Star”: An Outline for A 
Federal Right of Publicity, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 257, 258 (2009); Kevin L. Vick 
& Jean-Paul Jassy, Why A Federal Right of Publicity Statute Is Necessary, 28 COMM. LAW. 14 
(2011). 
